Substantive Law - Private Law: Conflict of Laws by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 13 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1951-1952 Term
January 1953
Substantive Law - Private Law: Conflict of Laws
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Substantive Law - Private Law: Conflict of Laws, 13 La. L. Rev. (1953)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol13/iss2/7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [
vate; this would suffice to prevent the, "tacit" dedication of such
a road. However, under the statute cited, there was a "forced"
dedication of the road which occurs not with reference to the
landowner's intent to keep it private but because of the three
years' maintenance and expense by the police jury with the full
approval of the landowner. A person can always keep his road
to himself, or he may be able to establish some sort of a shared
conditon by contract, but he cannot have the road maintained
at public expense and still keep it private.
OWNERSHIP
In the case of Lasyone v. Emerson7 an incidental question
concerned the possibility of a partition in kind of a building, in a
horizontal plane instead of the ordinary partition of property in
a vertical plane (by lots, or metes and bounds). The horizontal
idea was proposed as a separation of ownership between the
lower floor of the building and the upper floor. Of course, the
court made short shrift of such an unusual thought so foreign to
the Louisiana property concepts. However, before completely
brushing the idea aside, it might not be untimely to give it some
consideration with reference to the basic policies and objectives
of our property law. In many states it has proven feasible, and
in the general interest, to have separate ownership of individual
apartments in a large building, and in France it has been possible
for several people to have the separate ownership of each floor of
a building. The idea of a horizontal division of ownership in prop-
erty may ultimately be found unsuitable and undesirable for
Louisiana; nevertheless, it may not be amiss to give it some
thought for legislative consideration.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
DIVORCE RECOGNITION
Assertions of status and relationship are often generated for
purposes of property succession, but it is unusual to find a person
willing to brand herself as a bigamist by alleging seventeen years
later the invalidity of the divorce which had been obtained by
6. Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).
7. 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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her first husband. On the basis of this allegation, the plaintiff in
Rouse v. Rouse' claimed as community all the property acquired
by her first husband until the time of his death. The defendant
was his fourth wife, who claimed to be the real widow. The
divorce in question had been obtained in Mississippi within one
year from the marriage, and was rendered in favor of the husband
on the grounds of the wife's abandonment after one month of
married life. In view of her own remarriage, together with her
silence during seventeen years and through the husband's three
subsequent remarriages, the court held that she had "acquiesced"
in the Mississippi divorce and that she could not be permitted now
to attack collaterally its jurisdictional basis. The court pointed
out the interest which a state has in the marriage relation and the
undesirability of stigmatizing the status of many other innocent
people. At the same time, it distinguished its decision on the
grounds of "acquiescence" from the authorities in other states
which preclude attack against a foreign divorce on the grounds of
"estoppel" where the complainant himself (or herself) has acted
upon an acceptance of its validity.
On the facts of this case, there may not be much difference
between acquiescence and estoppel although it is conceivable
that some significant differences may be found between the two
principles. Whether this will develop depends upon the future
judicial decisions in subsequent cases of similar import.
An undeveloped element in this case is the divorce jurisdic-
tion of the Mississippi court. It is not clear why the parties
admitted that the Mississippi divorce could be attacked for lack
of jurisdiction. The original marriage took place in Mississippi
and the only matrimonial domicile at which husband and wife
lived together (even though less than one month) was in Missis-
sippi. No personal service was made on the defendant wife in the
divorce suit, and notice was by publication only. At the same
time, there was no showing that the wife had thereafter legally
acquired any other domicile in the conflict of laws sense (that is,
outside of Mississippi). Assuming that the divorce proceedings
had complied with the procedural requirements of Mississippi
law, the court had divorce jurisdiction even if the wife had
already changed her domicile. Such a divorce decree is now
entitled to full faith and credit under the Williams2 doctrine of
1. 219 La. 1065, 55 So. 2d 246 (1951).
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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the United States Supreme Court if the husband's domicile was in
Mississippi; and the same would be true even under the older
Atherton3 doctrine by reason of Mississippi having also been the
last matrimonial domicile.
Had the Louisiana court permitted an attack on the Missis-
sippi divorce, there might well have been a good petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds of
denial of full faith and credit. The outcome would then have
depended upon proof of the husband's domicile at the time of the
divorce suit, about which there was no clear evidence in the
present case-perhaps because the issue on appeal was limited to
the lower court's dismissal of the suit on an exception of no right
of action and the plea of estoppel.
CUSTODY
Jurisdiction in matters of child custody in conflict of laws
has given rise to considerable difficulty. While there is the usual
striving toward stability by means of legal concepts and rules,
there is also the functional consideration of the welfare of the
child as well as the conflicting pressures of separated parents. The
strict application of jurisdictional rules, such as domicile or resi-
dence or presence, combined with full faith and credit for sister-
state judgments, would not bring about the best results for all
the interests concerned. The developments in this field of the
law of conflict of laws are still fairly new, and the difficulties are
still numerous. 4 To alleviate the tension on courts, and to pro-
vide flexibility for readjustments, there has been developed the
"changed circumstances" doctrine, recently consolidated by the
United State Supreme Court in Halvey v. Halvey.5 In the light
of this doctrine, the court of one state can re-examine anew the
custody problem just as it could be re-examined by the court of
another state which had already rendered a prior decree.
In the case of State ex rel. Girtman v. Ricketson6 the remar-
ried Florida father was trying to recover custody in accordance
with a Florida custody decree of the child in the actual possession
of the remarried mother in Louisiana. The lower court considered
itself bound to recognize the Florida judgment, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed on the ground of the "changed circum-
3. 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
4. See Graveson, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 Conn. B.J.
44; Rheinstein, id. at 48; Dainow, id. at 232 (1952).
5. 330 U.S. 610 (1948).
6. 60 So. 2d 88 (La. 1952).
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stances" doctrine of the Halvey decision, and remanded the case
to receive the evidence which had previously been excluded con-
cerning changed conditions which arose subsequent to the Florida
judgment. The mother's chances of success are naturally much
greater at her domicile in Louisiana than in the Florida court
which had already ruled against her.
Little or no consideration is given to the mother's deceit in
getting the child for the Christmas holidays and her broken prom-
ise to send him right back. If the father had suspected anything
of the sort, he could have refused her request, and he could have
continued indefinitely his exclusive custody in Florida under the
Florida judgment (subject only to reasonable visits by the mother
in Florida). In so doing, the father could act selfishly within his
rights, but he might not be doing the best thing for the child.
On the basis of the "changed circumstances" doctrine, and
the present case, the father might now be encouraged to maneu-
ver the removal (kidnapping?) of the child to Florida and to the
protection of the former or a new Florida custody decree. The
"changed circumstances" doctrine presents more advantages of
an immediate sort than solutions of a permanent nature.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
For some time, it has been a well-established rule of conflict
of laws in Louisiana that a chattel mortgage duly executed in
another state and properly complying with the requirements
(form, recordation, et cetera) of that state, would be recognized
and given effect in Louisiana-even as against an innocent Loui-
siana purchaser-provided that the removal from the state of
execution to Louisiana was without the knowledge and consent
of the chattel mortgagee.7 It had not been categorically settled,
however, upon whom rested the burden of proof concerning this
all-important proviso: whether upon the innocent purchaser to
prove such knowledge or consent, or upon the chattel mortgagee
to prove its absence.
The question was squarely met in the case of G.F.C. Corpora-
tion v. Rollins.8 The plaintiff sought the sequestration of an auto-
mobile covered by a Missouri chattel mortgage which had not
been recorded in Louisiana. The plaintiff alleged absence of
knowledge or consent but insisted that it was not required to
7. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So.
323 (1940).
8. 221 La. 166, 59 So. 2d 108 (1952).
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prove this. Assuming, without deciding, that the chattel mortgage
would be enforceable in Missouri, the court cut directly to the
question of burden of proof. Without the benefit of any authori-
ties,9 the court reached the logical and reasonable conclusion that
"since plaintiff is seeking to have Louisiana recognize and enforce
an unrecorded foreign chattel mortgage against an innocent pur-
chaser of the automobile, a plain duty rested upon it to prove
that it was without knowledge that the car had been brought to
Louisiana as it is only in such circumstances that it can be excused
for its failure to comply with our laws of registry."1 0
There still appears to linger the tendency to call it a "rule
of comity"'1 when a claim asserted to have originated under the
laws of another state (or foreign country) is recognized in the
forum. It is submitted that designating the governing precept as
the appropriate "Louisiana rule of conflict of laws" would be
more specific. Whereas comity looks only to a recognition through
courtesy, a rule of conflict of laws would have the advantage of
a concrete assertion which can operate not only towards an
affirmative protection to an asserted claim but also towards a
negative denial. At the same time, it offers more stability and
predictability than the constantly shifting sands of the pure dis-
cretion or courtesy implied in the idea of comity. In the absence
of comprehensive legislative coverage, it is within the authority
and responsibility of the court to develop and formulate these
Louisiana rules of conflict of laws.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The number of cases wherein the court is called upon to
adjust the differences between the parties to contracts to sell
real estate has apparently not fallen off despite the fact that the
course of decision has of late been particularly clear. Four such
cases were presented during the last term.
9. This specific question of burden of proof does not seem to have given
much cause for concern because it is not mentioned in the usual conflict of
laws references. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 396-399 (2 ed. 1951);
Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws 486-488 (3 ed. 1949); Jones, Chat-
tel Mortgages and Conditional Sales; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 266,
268, 275; 68 A.L.R. 554, 87 A.L.R. 1298, 148 A.L.R. 375.
10. 59 So. 2d 108, 110.
11. 59 So. 2d 108, 109.
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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